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NOTE
CORPORATIONS-TRANSFER OF ASSETS-PROTESTS By MINORITY
STOCKHOLDERS.-The common law rule required the unanimous con-
sent of the shareholders to authorize a transfer of the assets of a cor-
poration.' A proposed conveyance would be enjoined as an impairment
of the shareholders contract, which was held to entitle him to a contin-
uance of the enterprise until the appointed time for dissolution. 2 Only
one exception was permitted to this strict rule. That was when the
corporation was experiencing financial difficulties.'
The problem stripped to its skeleton lies in the satisfying of a
minority stockholder. Theoretically there can be no solution short of a
complete injunction against the majority action. This proposition has
its basis in the contractual relation existing between the stockholder and
the corporation.4 On the other hand if due regard is given to the minor-
ity's right for a continuance of the corporation, the will of the majority
is disregarded and operation of the enterprise continued over their pro-
test. Conciliation is essential.' Statutes have been enacted in state after
state, which have taken from the individual stockholder the right there-
tofore existing to defeat the sale to or welding of the assets of his cor-
poration with those of another enterprise.6 Section 16 of the Stock Cor-
poration Law of New York provides, in effect, that sale, conveyance,
lease, or transfer of a corporation's property can be effected by a two-
thirds vote of the stock. Section 17 provides that the one-third not as-
senting to such action of the majority may apply to the court for an
appraisal of the value of their stock and compel payment thereof. It is
provided in Section 343 of the Civil Code of California: "No corpora-
tion may sell, transfer, exchange or otherwise dispose of all nor sub-
lNeither the directors nor a majority of the stockholders have power to sell
or otherwise transfer all the property of a going prosperous corporation as
against the dissent of a single stockholder. Abbott v. Rubber Co., 33 Barb.
578 (N.Y. 1861) ; People v. Ballard, 134 N.Y. 269, 32 N.E. 54 (1892) ; Ameri-
can Seating Company v. Ballard, 290 Fed. 896 (C.C.A. 6th, 1923) ; Des Moines
Life and Annuity Co. v. Midland Insurance Co., 6 F. (2d) 228 (D.C. Minn.
1925).
2 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 3670.
3Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge, 9 R.I. 590 (1870).
4 Kean v. Johnson, 9 N.J. Eq. 401 (1835).
5 There are circumstances arising which not only in the eyes of the majority,
but also in the judicial discretion of the courts demand judicial aid for the
good of the corporation. Under this, the liberal doctrine, the courts have
found an escape from the harshness of the strict rule. A vote by the majority
stockholders to windup the affairs of the corporation is justified where such
corporation is in financial trouble and no longer accomplishes it's purpose.
Treadwill v. Manufacturing Co., 7 Gray 393 (Mass. 1856). In the case of
Forrester v. Boston and Montana Consolidated Copper Mining Co., 21 Mont.
544, 55 Pac. 229 (1898), the court granted an injunction restraining the
majority's selling out the successful Montana corporation to a New York
corporation of the same name such being done for the convenience of direc-
tors in the east. In Werle v. Northwestern Flint and Sandpaper Co., 125 Wis.
534, 104 N.W. 743 (1905), the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in answer to a
minority stockholder's action to set aside a sale of the entire corporate prop-
erty of the corporation, held the sale valid as it was made in good faith for the
best interests of the stockholders. The company was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. See also Hill v. St. Louis Coke and Iron Corporation, 9 F. Supp. 69
(D.C. Del. 1935).
6 Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 172 At. 452 (Del. 1934).
NOTE
stantially all of its property and assets except under authority of a reso-
lution of its board of directors approved by the vote or written consent
of the stockholders entitled to exercise a majority of the voting power
on such proposal before or after the adoption of the resolution by the
directors." Section 180.11(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes permits the
holders of a majority of the shares of stock outstanding to sell, convey
or lease, or to authorize to be sold, conveyed or leased all of the cor-
porate assets whenever that shall be necessary for the best interests of
the enterprise. Similar statutes are in force in practically all other
states, differing somewhat as to the necessary vote required. The prin-
cipal question today involves not only the power to sell but the power
of the majority to force upon the minority stock in a new corporation
as a substitute for the original corporate stock.
In tracing the adjustments of the courts in aid of the minority stock-
holder sound reasoning is apparent. In earlier times corporations were
little more than enlarged partnerships with monopolistic privileges.
Limited liability and large scale enterprises are more modem develop-
ments. Courts have found it difficult to mold decisions about trusts and
holding companies into common law categories. It is generally accurate
to say that courts today will not substitute their judgment for that of
the directors of a corporation as to what is good business policy
or as to what is beneficial to the corporation in the absence of evi-
dence of fraud upon minority stockholders.8 Practically coordinate with
the idea of broad general power in the majority is the new problem of
forcing shares in another corporation upon the minority as incidental
in carrying out the plan of the majority." Many of the statutes passed
in the last decade merely sought definitely to give the majority the
power to sell providing for the payment to dissenting stockholders. The
legislature in Minnesota enacted a statute in 1925 authorizing corpora-
tions to sell or exchange their propertyfa This statute among other
matters literally provided that, "Every corporation heretofore or here-
after organized under the laws of this state may at any meeting of its
board of directors, sell, lease, or exchange all of its property, rights,
privileges and franchises upon such terms and conditions as its board of
directors deem expedient, and for the best interest of the corporation
when and as authorized by the affirmative vote of the holders of two-
thirds of the shares of stock of the company issued and outstanding
having voting power given at a stockholders' meeting duly called for
7 See Patterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281
(1932).
sPutnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corporation, 307 Mo. 74, 269 N.W. 593, 40 A.L.R.
1416 (1925); statutory remedy held exclusive remedy for minority stock-
holders complaining of sale of corporation property unless there was fraud,
Wick v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 41 Ohio App. 253, 188 N.E. 515
(1932).
SA few isolated cases are on record previous to the last decade, such as Lau-
man v. Penn. R. R., 30 Pa. 42, 72 Am. Dec. 685 (1858), and Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co. v. Toledo & S. W. H. Co., 54 Fed. 759 (C.C.A. 6th, 1893). It was
held in both cases a dissenting shareholder cannot be forced to take the stock
of the purchasing corporation. See also Elyton Land Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala.
177, 20 So. 981, 59 Am. St. Rep. 105 (1896) ; Doe Run Lead Co. v. Maynard,
283 Mo. 646, 223 S.W. 600 (1920); William Ricker and Son Co. v. United
Drug Co., 79 N.J. Eq. 580, 82 Atl. 930 (1912).
9a Minn. Laws (1925) c. 320.
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that purpose, or when authorized by the written consent of the holders
of two-thirds of the shares of stock of the company issued and out-
standing having voting power. Provided, however, that the certificate
of incorporation may require the vote or written consent of a larger
portion of the stockholders." In 1927 the legislature made provision for
the consolidation of corporations and the payment to non-assenting
stockholders for their stock.'" The 1925 statute is not applicable to a
mere transfer of assets in consideration of stock in the new corpora-
tion." The 1927 statute merely provides for appraisal of non-assenting
shares when the corporate property is voted for sale. In the wake of
these statutory provisions, Minnesota has had two important cases
raising the matter of a majority's right to force shares upon non-
assenting stockholders in the transfer of the corporate property. In
Patterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Company,12 where holdings of
dissenting stockholders objecting to consolidation of two Minnesota
corporations into one Delaware corporation were small in comparison
with that of the majority, the court gave the minority the option to take
stock or the value thereof. In Hill v. Page and Hill Companys the
same court went a step further in holding under the circumstances 14
that a majority of the stockholders of the Minnesota corporation were
justified in authorizing the transfer of all its assets for stock in a Dela-
ware corporation organized by them against the protest of a minority
stockholder. The Minnesota corporation was justified in accepting
stock in the Delaware corporation in payment for the property. In this
power of the majority to force shares upon the dissenting stockholders
Minnesota seems to stand practically alone. The courts of other states
and the federal courts in the few cases adjudicated do not seem to have
gone that far. 5
In conclusion it may be said that in a majority of the states today it
is provided that a shareholder cannot object to the transfer of the cor-
porate assets; he buys his share or shares subject to the power of sale,
transfer, merger and consolidation in the majority. As compensation
for this broad power in the majority the minority who voice their con-
sent as per statute have the privilege of securing cash for their stock.
As to whether the majority can force the minority to accept shares
instead of money, the Minnesota court seems to stand alone. The Wis-
consin court has not had occasion to adjudicate these questions, with
reference to transfer of stock, but the local statutes do give the power
of sale to the majority. As to any indications of what rule Wisconsin
might adopt, such is highly speculative. From the viewpoint of a
minority stockholder it would seem to be a thrusting of unwanted lia-
bilities and burdens upon him. THOMAS J. BERGEN.
10 Minn. Laws (1927) c. 385.
11 Patterson v. Shattuck Ariz. Copper Co., 186 Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932).
12186 Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932).
13 (Minn. 1936) 268 N.W. 705.
14 The circumstances were in short-a depression scarred corporation operating
on a losing basis and facing the time limit of its charter.
1- Mason v. Pewabie Mining Co., 133 U.S. 50, 10 Sup. Ct. 224, 33 L.ed. 524(1889) ; Koehler v. St. Mary's Brew. Co., 228 Pa. 648, 97 Atl. 1016 (1910) ;
Ringler v. Atlas Portland Cement Company, 301 Pa. 176, 151 Atl. 815 (1930).
The case of Voigt v. Rewick, 260 Mich. 113, 244 N.W. 446 (1912), seems to
hold with the Minnesota court.
